Background: Inter-organiza onal healthcare businesses are ruled by a huge set of policies: legal policies, organiza onal policies, medical policies, ethical policies, etc., which are quite sta c, pa ents policy and process, social and environmental condi ons, which are highly dynamic. In the context of a business case, those diff erent policies must be harmonized to enable privilege management and access control decisions.
Introduc on
Th e University of Genoa -supported by the Institute of Social Medicine and Health Economy at the University of Magdeburg, Germany -currently engages in the establishment of a cancer care network combining regional healthcare establishments at primary, secondary and tertiary care level. Breast cancer is the most frequent type of cancer, establishing 30% of the cancers females in Italy are suff ering from [1] . In females, it is the fi rst cause of death [2] . Breast cancer care is a multi-disciplinary challenge involving diff erent specialties and units in a hospital, but can also crossorganizationally include diff erent hospitals, clinics, practices and laboratories.
For improving quality and effi ciency of care delivery, health systems around the globe are evolving towards
Original Ar cle
inter-organizational, inter-regional and even international communication and cooperation, increasingly based on Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems.
Two of the most important prerequisites to interorganizational collaboration are security and privacy for establishing trust between the actors involved in the business case including the patient. Security aims at guaranteeing information availability, confi dentiality, integrity, authenticity and accountability. Privacy is a human right for self-determination, respecting legal requirements, ethical principles, personal preferences and expectations regarding collection, processing, communication and use of personal data, thereby preventing harm from disclosure of that personal information [3] . One of the key elements to provide security and privacy is privilege management and access control to information and functionalities. Figure 1 illustrates the schema of a general access control system [4] .
Th e business case deals with access to clinical objects stored in the EHR, which is not a banal information sharing. Permissions have to be managed in a way that only the medical staff involved in the patient care can access a patient's clinic information according to the 'need to know' principle. It is important to underline that both communication security and application security are relevant. Using an EHR system, the authors will focus on application security, considering communication security as a prerequisite and not healthcare specifi c.
In healthcare context, policies that have to be respected are a complex mix of legal, organizational, functional, medical, social, ethical and technical aspects [3] . In addition, also personal wishes, local, timely, contextual and environmental constraints have to be considered [5] . We can distinguish at least legal and domain-specifi c policies, organizational policies, process-related policies as well as personal policies. Domain-specifi c policies are, e.g., the Hippocratic Oath, the medical code of conduct and ethical principles. Th e patient consent is frequently mistakenly called a personal policy. However, it is just the agreement or disagreement with an organizational policy [6] . For distributed business cases, also security and privacy management must be realized in a distributed way. Figure 2 presents the policies and the conditions defi ning the relation between a physician and a patient [7] . Th is is the most complex relation, because it involves a large number of policies: legal policies, organizational policies, ethical policies, etc., which are quite static, the subject of care policy and process, social and environment conditions, which are highly dynamic. In the context of a business case, those diff erent policies must be harmonized to enable privilege management and access control decisions. In general, the more the subjects, their knowledge, experiences and skills are close and implicitly sharable, the easier is policy harmonization.
In this paper, the authors want to off er a systemtheoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, policydriven approach to achieve interoperability through policies harmonization in a privilege management and access control solution for EHR systems, to be implemented using HL7 specifi cations.
Principles and Methodologies
In order to realize appropriate privilege management and access control, it is fundamental to fi nd a thorough model, which is an abstract representation of that part of the reality the business case deals with. Th e authors will deploy system theory for that purpose.
A system is group/composition of elements separated from the environment according to properties or needs in the context of a business process. A system could be a part of a super-system, or it can be split in subsystems. A system could be analyzed in two diff erent ways, resulting in the black box approach and the white box approach. Th e black box approach assesses the system's input-output functional relationship. With this approach, we can describe the overall function of the system without understanding the internal processes and the reasons behind. To carry out greater control, it is necessary to move from the black box to the [7] . white box approach. With the white box analysis, a system is conceived as a collection of interrelated elements. Th at way, a system is more than just the sum of its components. A system can be represented through its architecture, describing the elements that compose the system, their functions and relationships. Th e complete understanding of structure, function and relationships of the system elements allows controlling the system itself. Th e set of rules that controls the behavior of the system is named policy. For managing a quite complex business case, the authors have to use the white box approach.
An ontology is a formal "explicit specifi cation of a conceptualization" [8] of the domain of interest. An ontology defi nes a controlled vocabulary and represents domain knowledge in a formal and structured form. It consists of concepts, concept defi nitions and relations between those concepts. A formal description decreases language ambiguity. It allows to make domain assumption explicit, to share knowledge between agents, to re-use and to analyze knowledge [9, 10] .
Results
In a business process, an entity requests access to some information objects. Th e purpose of privilege management is to provide the permissions, if any, the entity has, deciding on when, where, why, for which purpose, how, under which conditions. Th en, according to the assigned permissions, the request of access to the resource has to be permitted, denied or modifi ed (as instance veiling some information).
In order to guarantee an appropriate privilege management and access control, a prior observation of the business is fundamental. Th rough observation, interpretation and understanding of the system, its relationships and its rules can be derived and represented as knowledge. Accepted ontologies enable creation, representation and management of the knowledge about the domain of interest in a consistent, reasonably expressive and formalized way that properly refl ects the reality.
For realizing interoperability, i.e. advanced communication and cooperation, the diff erent policies must be harmonized. If policies are static and can therefore be predefi ned, policy harmonization can be performed in advance by coordinating or aligning policies relevant for the predefi ned business case in the design and defi nition phase already. Th is is, e.g., the case when defi ning, negotiating and contracting disease management programs (DMPs). We must have in mind however the impossibility of predefi ning any thinkable policy harmonization, e.g. in open care settings and personalized health, as some of the policies to be applied are not known at that time. Furthermore and even more relevant, the consideration of any thinkable policy would make the system too complex, and therefore undefi ned and not computable. In consequence, we should only consider policies relevant for the corresponding business case. If the harmonization of business case related policies cannot be performed in advance, it has to be performed at run time, using decision intelligence systems for security and privacy services, especially for a specifi c privilege management. Dynamic policy harmonization can be performed by a system-theoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, policy-driven approach. Figure 3 shows the policy-driven RBAC schema, which is provided by ISO 22600 [6] .
In this schema, the principal is the user who wants to access a resource (an information object as target or a service). Th e structural role is the role assigned to the user by the organization, such as head physician, medical doctor, nurse, etc., but also specifi c qualifi cations or competences. Th e structural roles policy represents the relationships within the organization and is quite static. Th e process policy is the set of rules that control the business process. In the healthcare context, a process policy can be established through clinic guidelines or best practice guidelines. Th e functional role is the role that the user has related to the process, which is connected to the actions he/she can perform on resources in a certain process act, e.g. ordering an observation, justifying a statement by signature, or prescribing a medication, so becoming a requester, signer, prescriber. In the business case described, the target policy is strongly infl uenced by the fact that information objects are clinic information stored in the EHR. Th anks to its fl exibility, this model is able to formally represent all the other access control models. Th is means that in the context of an inter-organizational collaboration all the policies can be formalized and then harmonized without touching them. So, cross-organizational interoperability can be provided irrespective of the access control level and the underlying access control model of the single organization. Th e model in Figure 3 can be extended by top level policies any business is bound to such as legislation, ethical rules, etc. In order to harmonize policies, it is necessary to obtain a consistent formalization of the policies themselves. Following the policies, rules can be applied to assign privileges to actors or to roles played by actors. While the fi rst case allows binding static policies to individual actors, the second enables an easier manageable rather coarsegrained binding of policies to roles, which in the worst case are structural roles and therefore static. When considering functional (predefi ned) roles, the business process defi nes the roles and privileges assignment to an entity. As an outcome, we implement statically Access Control Lists (ACLs), Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC), or Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
HL7 provides a special policy-driven solution for managing security and privacy in a business case and an individual context, and for deciding on that basic on privileges at runtime. Within the US national project of data segmentation for advancing communication and cooperation between healthcare establishments, HL7 has specifi ed the HL7 Healthcare Privacy and Security Classifi cation System (HCS) -Release 1 [11] . Th is specifi cation defi nes security labels as markers bound to a resource, which connect an information object, but also process steps or actions, to a set of security and privacy attributes. Th is solution has already been demonstrated at diff erent HIMSS events [5, 12] .
Th e HL7 Healthcare Privacy and Security Classifi cation System consists of two parts:
• A context-sensitive segmentation of health information;
• Security and privacy labeling of data segments, enabling machine processing of privilege management and access control.
In HCS specifi cation, security labels are defi ned as metadata bound to resources that transmit constraints on the use of the resources. Security labels are applied based on risk assessment of harm resulting from unauthorized disclosure. "Th is assessment may refl ect personal perceptions or legal requirements, which may involve inherently emotional characterization of clinical information as prejudicial to a party's "interests" when exposed in unauthorized ways or to those who lack authority and responsibility for its care and use" [11] . With the implicit knowledge stored in security labels as "mini policy", privilege management and access control decisions can be performed without accessing the target information. Th e label refers to the explicit policy stored in a policy repository to be accessed when needed for interpretation as explained in some more detail as follows.
NIST FIPS PUB 188 specifi cation defi nes a security label as a set of specifi ed fi elds. Each fi eld consists of globally unique Tag Set Name and a set of semantically interoperable security tag or fi eld values. Th ese labels defi ne the classifi cation of each item. HL7 HCS specifi es a Security Classifi cation Tag Set (Confi dentiality), a Security Categorization Tag Set (Sensitivity, Integrity, Compartment, Privacy Law), and Handling Caveat Tag Set (Purpose of Use, Obligations, Refrain Policies). In the following, the label fi elds will be introduced in some details [13] :
• Confi dentiality: classifi es an IT resource (clinical fact, data, information object, service, or system capability) according to its level of sensitivity, which is based on an analysis of applicable privacy policies and the risk of fi nancial, reputational, or other harm to an individual that could result from unauthorized disclosure;
• Sensitivity: categorizes the value, importance and vulnerability of an IT resource perceived as undesirable to share;
• Integrity: conveys the completeness, veracity, reliability, trustworthiness and provenance of an IT resource;
• Compartment: "segments" an IT resource by indicating that access and use is restricted to members of a defi ned community or project. An example for compartment labels is "for pharmacy only";
• Privacy Law: refers to the corresponding legislation;
• Handling Caveat: conveys dissemination controls and information handling caveats, such as constraining the purpose of use, defi ning concrete refrain policies and obligations to which an IT resource custodian or receiver must comply.
Confi dentiality, Sensitivity, Integrity and Compartment fi elds characterize security and privacy rules ("mini policies") for specifi c health information. Instead, handling caveat fi elds are characteristics of activities, such as processes of using that information. Th e valid security labels and how they have to be compared with the users' clearances have to be expressed as explicit policies specifi ed in the Security Policy Information Files (SPIF). Th e SPIF are usually XML based [5] .
Th e newest project established at HL7 for privilege management and access control is the draft specifi cation "Privacy and Security Architecture Framework -Trust Framework for Federated Authorization, Release 1. Being more consistent with the prosed methodology than older specifi cations, also this model can be represented and harmonized with others following the presented approach [14] .
For managing and harmonizing the diff erent privilege management and access control models, Figure 3 is used as Reference Architecture Model of the privilege management and access control system. For that purpose, all those models have to be architecturally represented in that schema.
All the diff erent policies provided by the diff erent solutions presented have to be considered for the specifi c privilege assignment and access control decisions. For concluding on all those policies, the concepts have to be provided at a level of expressivity and formalization allowing that all concepts established by domain experts or laymen from diff erent domains in diff erent context with diff erent education, experiences and skills can be appropriately and consistently taken into consideration. For that purpose, the concepts of the policy domain have been ordered and interrelated in the policy domain ontology as described in ISO 22600 [6] . Additionally to the defi nition of the base classes of that ontology and their structural relations, the latter must be quantifi ed using a proper logic representation. Th e knowledge (concept) processing in the decision making process is based on an ontology harmonization process. An extended study of relevant tools to perform this task is underway as well.
More details related to access control models and their policies formalization will be presented in [15] .
For implementing the policy decision process, existing standards and related services can be used as shortly discussed in the following.
Within the scope of the HCS and its use in an access control system, there are two principal services: the Security Labeling Service (SLS) and the Privacy and Protective Services (PPS) [16] . Th e SLS evaluates the submitted clinical information objects, including clinical tagging and provenance, to determine the appropriate security labels to assign to information objects for access control based on rules. Access Decision Services can then use the labeled clinical objects as classifi ed resource Access Control Decision Information (ADI) to check clearances. Access decision policy can be dynamic, particularly in the case of patient preferences. For this reason, labels should be applied at runtime, rather than being permanently stored with information objects. In this way, classifi ed resource ADI could be current with the most current policy. Th e SLS is supported by a Security Label Management System. Th e latter establishes, provisions, and manages the security tagging vocabularies and security labeling rules needed to support jurisdictional, organizational privacy and security policies, including patient consent directives. Once an access control decision is made, also obligations should be met before releasing the resources. Th en, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) decision and obligations are provided to a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), which tasks appropriate obligation services, such as PPS, to impose the obligations. Basing upon rules, the PPS can apply various transforms to the security labeled resources: masking, redaction, shedding, shift ing, annotations, anonymization, pseudo-anonymization, etc. Th e PPS is supported by its own Protective Services Management Sub-System, which establishes the type of transformations to be applied based upon rules. Th e latter can be determined in advance or dynamically at runtime. Th e transformed resource is fi nally sent to the recipient [5] .
Once users' clearances, resources security labels and SPIF are defi ned, privilege and access control management in health information systems can be automated [5] .
For implementing the aforementioned advanced service, the HL7 Implementation Guide: Data Segmentation for Privacy (DS4P) as well as HL7 Version 3 Standard: Privacy, Access and Security Services; Security Labeling Service [16, 17] have been specifi ed. Th is Implementation Guide, including the value defi nitions and references, must be localized for the Italian environment. Figure 4 presents the Access Control logical architecture model [18] .
Deployment of the Developed Methodology
Th e aforementioned privilege management and access control models refer to predefi ned policies in their informational representation. As the informational representation is usually defi ned by informaticians, the consistency with real world policies cannot be guaranteed. Th e solution off ered by the paper is overcoming those limitations by:
• Th e defi nition of all policies relevant for a specifi c business case using the domain specifi c terminologies;
• Th e formal representation of those policies using the domain specifi c ontologies;
• Th e harmonization of real world policies at runtime.
Th en, it is intuitive that static and rigid policies are not suitable. Instead, policies coming from diff erent domains have to be mapped dynamically and in an adaptive and automated way. In order to allow this, it is essential to provide a formal description of the policies that can be used by the authorization services to obtain the security and privacy rules to apply to the resources [19] . Furthermore, the environment conditions have to be evaluated in the same moment in which the user makes the access request. To implement an access control • To service functionalities: it is necessary to make a functional description of the service, specifying security and privacy minimum requirements for each functionality through security labels, or at the next level by dynamically representing the related explicit policy;
• To the resources: the resources have to be classifi ed through security labels, or at the next level by dynamically representing the related explicit policy.
Th rough the description of the security and privacy labels (or the explicit policies) of processes and resources, the authorization service is able to obtain the policy to be applied and to check the resulting constraints at runtime. As mentioned above, the policies that have to be mapped come from diff erent domains. So, policies must be formally expressed for allowing their integration in advanced e-health environments. Since diff erent expression means will be used to formally modelling policies, measures and tools for expressing and mapping them have to be developed. Interoperability between diff erent domains requires ontology management by harmonizing common ontology domains' sub-ontologies (e.g. harmonizing concepts of medical sub-ontologies such as SNOMED and LOINC) or by linking diff erent domains' ontologies (e.g. linking policy and medical concepts or linking legal policy and medical policy). Harmonizing ontologies can be performed a-priori by merging, aligning, integrating, or at runtime by matching or mapping. Matching addresses the management of equivalent concepts, while mapping addresses the management of similar concepts. As ontologies are used to represent architectural components of the Generic Component Model (GCM) at appropriate level of generalization/specialization, the GCM process principles also apply to the ontology management (e.g., only interrelating concepts at the same level of granularity).
Discussion
In this paper, the authors off er a solution for policy harmonization for privilege management and access control in healthcare context to be implemented using HL7 specifi cations. Personal health information and related process information will be managed using the Italian Fascicolo Sanitario Elettronico (FSE). Th e FSE is a regional EHR approach to collect clinical data and documents produced by present or past clinical events and constitutes the patient clinical history. Th e FSE can be accessed through the Internet with appropriate security and privacy measures in place. Th e patient can have access to his/her FSE through personal credentials or a smartcard [20] .
In order to guarantee adequate privilege management and access control, it is necessary to identify the subjects who request to access to the resources. For this reason, the solution must include an authentication service. Th e authors focused on authorization services, supposing that an adequate system for identifi cation and authentication already exists. Th is assumption is justifi ed by the current Italian governmental eff ort to set up a national identity system called Sistema Pubblico di Identità Digitale (SPID), Public System of Digital Identity [21] . As its name suggests, the SPID is a national service that provides a digital identity for Italian citizens. Th e latter are identifi ed through the fi scal code (Codice Fiscale), which is an alphanumeric code of sixteen characters that is associated to Italian individuals at birth and to foreigners when having contacts with Italian institutions. Th e fi scal code depends on the subject's name, surname, sex, place and date of birth and is unique and tailored for the person. Up to now, the SPID supplies two levels of authentication [22] . At the fi rst level, one factor authentication is provided by a password. At the second level, two factor authentication is provided by a password and a One Time Password. During 2017, a more secure two factor authentication, provided through a password and a physical medium (such as a smart card) should be available for fi rst services. Eff orts similar to the SPID are also performed in other European countries with the opportunity of cross-border use, see the Electronic identifi cation and electronic Trust Services (eIDAS) regulation [23, 24] . However, a strong and secure three factor authentication is fundamental for activities as awkward as healthcare.
In Italy, healthcare organizations have diff erent access control models: in some organizations access control is static, rigid and strongly hierarchy dependent (MAC); in others authorized subjects can delegate permissions to other users (DAC); in rare cases, it is possible to fi nd a role based privilege management (RBAC). All of these solutions have been the result of past investments of money and in many cases organizations have not the possibility to make progress towards more advanced access control. Th e methodology provided by the authors enables at run time the harmonization of all the policies irrespective of the access control model used in the organizations. Th is off ers the opportunity to consider also patient policies, which are strongly dynamic, that way enabling the move from an organization-centered care to a patient-centered care. In addition, since all the access control models can be formally represented with the schema in Figure 3 , the methodology does not hamper organizations progressing to more advanced privilege management and access control solutions. Th ese are the advantages of the authors' approach over other solutions that enable harmonization only by static pre-coordination or even require the use of identical or at least equivalent solutions. As a consequence of such pre-coordination, only organizations with the stated access control model can join the intraorganizational collaboration. In addition, since policies are not harmonized at run time, a predefi ned solution can fi t only organization centered healthcare.
Conclusion
Th e authors provide a methodology to enable policies harmonization in EHR systems by deploying a systemtheoretical, architecture-centric, ontology-based, policydriven approach, which:
• Is irrespective of the maturity of organizations privilege management and access control system;
• Does not hamper organizations progressing to more advanced privilege management and access control system over the time;
• Accepts also dynamic policies;
• Allows to advance towards a patient-centered care;
• Is implementation-independent.
